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audiences are contained within the 
nation-state structure� When war is a 
contest between two sides, the audiences 
are easy to identify, and traditionally 
these audiences understand the out-
come of the war in terms of the contest 
between the armed forces of the sides� 
When multiple strategic audiences, some 
of them not contained within or associ-
ated with nation-states, do not under-
stand or interpret the military outcome 
in the same way, “the military outcome 
does not provide a stable basis upon 
which to define a conflict’s outcome�” 
Simpson argues that “strategic confusion 
can result when conflicts characterized 
by competition between many actors in 
a fragmented political environment are 
shoehorned into a traditional concept of 
war, which is two polarized sides�” The 
information revolution and advances 
in communications and social media 
have exacerbated this problem, forcing 
overlap not only between the tactical 
and strategic levels of war but between 
the tactical and policy levels as well� 
Simpson describes war as a competition 
between strategic narratives� Accord-
ingly, planners at all levels should be 
targeting strategic audiences as centers 
of gravity� It is a matter not so much of 
the Clausewitzian dictum that war is 
designed to compel your enemy to do 
your will but of compelling your target 
audience to understand your message� 
War from the Ground Up provides case 
studies for this proposition ranging 
from the coalition effort in Afghanistan 
in 2006 to the British strategy in the 
Borneo conflict in the mid-1960s� The 
author also addresses other insurgen-
cies throughout the narrative, including 
the conflict in Sri Lanka and Russian 
operations in Chechnya, and refers to 
the work of prominent authors who 
have weighed in on the changed nature 
of warfare in the twenty-first century, 
such as David Kilcullen, Colonel Gian 
Gentile, and Antonio Giustozzi� A 
visiting defense fellow at Oxford in 
2011, Simpson fuses a firm grasp of 
traditional humanities and philosophy 
with his experience in Afghanistan� 
He has provided us with what may be 
one of the most important books on 
strategy in a long time� No short review 
can do justice to this remarkable book, 
which should be read by all military 
officers and policy makers, as well as 
anyone involved with the planning 
and execution of military operations� 
JEFFREY SHAW
Naval War College 
Erickson, Andrew S� Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic 
Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajecto-
ries, and Strategic Implications� Washington, D�C�: 
Jamestown Foundation, 2013� 110pp� $18
Andrew S� Erickson is a leading author-
ity on Chinese naval developments� 
His research and linguistic abilities are 
matched by his careful, systematic analy-
sis� In this work Erickson thoroughly 
surveys the existing literature in English 
and Chinese addressing Beijing’s efforts 
to deploy antiship ballistic missiles 
(ASBMs) able to strike large warships at 
ranges of more than a thousand miles� 
The author credits China with develop-
ing ASBMs as part of its strategy of “us-
ing the land to control the sea�” However, 
this represents a misinterpretation of na-
val history� While it is true that “a ship’s a 
fool to fight a fort,” it is also true that no 
nation has successfully defeated a naval 
force with land power alone� Examples 
include President Thomas Jefferson’s 
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construction of coastal forts and of 
a fleet of inshore gunboats to fight 
Britain’s global navy, and the success-
ful U�S� amphibious campaign against 
Japan’s island bastions in World War II� 
Erickson’s key question is, How suc-
cessful is China’s ASBM system? He 
concludes that a functioning ASBM 
has been developed by Beijing but 
that final operating capacity remains a 
work in progress� Erickson highlights 
a crucial weakness in China’s efforts 
to deploy such a complex system of 
systems when he describes the “tre-
mendously complex and difficult 
process” of ensuring “extremely close 
coordination” among several branches 
and agencies in a Chinese bureaucracy 
notable for lacking that attribute� 
The ASBM-warhead issue is not satisfac-
torily addressed in the literature� Why 
would a U�S� commander assume that 
an incoming ballistic missile is armed 
with a conventional warhead and not a 
nuclear one? Employing ASBMs poses a 
possibly insuperable danger of escalation 
from conventional to nuclear warfare� 
As Erickson points out in his conclusion, 
“PLA sources reveal overconfidence 
in China’s ability to control escalation, 
which is itself an extraordinary danger�”
The author’s conclusion that an air-
craft carrier group “would have a large 
electromagnetic signature” ignores the 
progress made in the 1980s in operating 
under dramatically reduced electronic 
emissions conditions� Also, the author 
errs if he attributes to China a unique 
policy of “asymmetry” in the develop-
ment of weapons designed to counter 
U�S� military strengths� Any intelligent 
military does that� I also question the 
author’s conclusion that the United 
States is “on the ‘wrong end of phys-
ics’” with respect to matching China 
militarily, in view of his inability to 
describe countermeasures presently 
under development or in force�
However, these are minor criticisms of a 
thoughtful evaluation of current Chinese 
efforts to defend the homeland and exert 
control over the waters Beijing believes 
vital to national-security interests� Also 
impressive is Erickson’s appreciation of 
the possibility of “deeply destabilizing” 
strategic effects of successful Chinese 
maritime control strategies on the Asian 
political situation—that is, a success-
ful ASBM will not simply be a tactical 
weapon� This is a book that every naval 
officer and civilian analyst must read�
BERNARD D� COLE
National Defense University
Nordquist, Myron H�, and John Norton Moore, 
eds� Maritime Border Diplomacy. Boston, Mass�: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2012� 366pp� $146�98
In 2011 the thirty-fifth annual confer-
ence on the law of the sea and oceans 
policy was held in Bali, Indonesia� 
The conference attracted (as it always 
does) an impressive array of presenters 
and attendees� The editors offer with 
this work a compilation of the papers 
presented� Perhaps because they made 
no concessions to make the presenta-
tions “accessible,” the result is some-
thing of a rarity—a compilation that 
remains interesting and useful� Each of 
the seven sections has much to recom-
mend it� All are potentially useful, and 
the “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms” 
section is especially well presented�
This collection is a fascinating spec-
trum of topics ranging from specific 
cases, such as the “2008 China-Japan 
Agreement on Cooperation for the 
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